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EDMUND BURKE ON THE MORAL IMAGINATION 
STUDY GUIDE 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
NOTE:  Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1789-90) are written 
in the style of a lengthy letter written in reply to an acquaintance in Paris who sought an 
expression of his approval of recent events in revolutionary France.  Far into his 
meditation, Burke introduces the “concept of the moral imagination, the mark of true 
civilization; and he discusses the two principles which sustained the European world – 
the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion.” 
 
I flatter myself that I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty as well as any 
gentleman of that society [Society for Constitutional Information, which supported the 
Revolution], be he who he will; and perhaps I have given as good proofs of my 
attachment to that cause in the whole course of my public conduct.  I think I envy liberty 
as little as they do to any other nation.  But I cannot stand forward and give praise or 
blame to anything which relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple 
view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and 
solitude of metaphysical abstraction.  Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass 
for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and 
discriminating effect.  The circumstances are what render every civil and political 
scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind.  Abstractedly speaking, government, as well 
as liberty, is good; yet could I, in common sense, ten years ago, have felicitated France 
on her enjoyment of a government (for she then had a government) without inquiry what 
the nature of that government was, or how it was administered?  Can I now congratulate 
the same nation upon its freedom?  Is it because liberty in the abstract may be classed 
amongst the blessings of mankind, that I am seriously to felicitate a madman, who has 
escaped from the protecting restraint and wholesome darkness of his cell, on his 
restoration to the enjoyment of light and liberty?  Am I to congratulate a highwayman 
and murderer who has broke prison upon the recovery of his natural rights?  This 
would be to act over again the scene of the criminals condemned to the galleys, and 
their heroic deliverer, the metaphysic Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance [Miguel de 
Cervantes’s Don Quixote]. 
When I see the spirit of liberty in action, I see a strong principle at work; and 
this, for a while, is all I can possibly know of it.  The wild gas, the fixed air, is plainly 
broke loose; but we ought to suspend our judgment until the first effervescence is a little 
subsided, till the liquor is cleared, and until we see something deeper than the agitation 
of a troubled and frothy surface.  I must be tolerably sure, before I venture publicly to 
congratulate men upon a blessing, that they have really received one.  Flattery corrupts 
both the receiver and the giver, and adulation is not of more service to the people than 
to kings. I should, therefore, suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France 
until I was informed how it had been combined with government, with public force, with 
the discipline and obedience of armies, with the collection of an effective and well-
distributed revenue, with morality and religion, with the solidity of property, with peace 
and order, with civil and social manners.  All these (in their way) are good things, too, 
and without them liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and is not likely to continue long.  
The effect of liberty to individuals is that they may do what they please; we ought to see 
what it will please them to do, before we risk congratulations which may be soon turned 
into complaints.  Prudence would dictate this in the case of separate, insulated, private 
men, but liberty, when men act in bodies, is power.  Considerate people, before they 
declare themselves, will observe the use which is made of power and particularly of so 
trying a thing as new power in new persons of whose principles, tempers, and 
dispositions they have little or no experience, and in situations where those who appear 
the most stirring in the scene may possibly not be the real movers. 
. . . . 
Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta. You will see that Sir Edward 
Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed all the great men who follow him, to 
Blackstone, are industrious to prove the pedigree of our liberties.  They endeavor to 
prove that the ancient charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was connected with 
another positive charter from Henry I, and that both the one and the other were nothing 
more than a reaffirmance of the still more ancient standing law of the kingdom.  In 
the matter of fact, for the greater part these authors appear to be in the right; perhaps 
not always; but if the lawyers mistake in some particulars, it proves my position still the 
more strongly, because it demonstrates the powerful prepossession toward antiquity, 
with which the minds of all our lawyers and legislators, and of all the people whom they 
wish to influence, have been always filled, and the stationary policy of this kingdom in 
considering their most sacred rights and franchises as an inheritance. 
In the famous law of the 3rd of Charles I, called the Petition of Right, the 
parliament says to the king, "Your subjects have inherited this freedom", claiming their 
franchises not on abstract principles "as the rights of men", but as the rights of 
Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers.  [John] Selden and the 
other profoundly learned men who drew this Petition of Right were as well acquainted, 
at least, with all the general theories concerning the "rights of men" as any of the 
discoursers in our pulpits or on your tribune; full as well as Dr. [Richard] Price or as the 
Abbe Sieyes. But, for reasons worthy of that practical wisdom which superseded their 
theoretic science, they preferred this positive, recorded, hereditary title to all which can 
be dear to the man and the citizen, to that vague speculative right which exposed their 
sure inheritance to be scrambled for and torn to pieces by every wild, litigious spirit. 
The same policy pervades all the laws which have since been made for the preservation 
of our liberties. In the 1st of William and Mary, in the famous statute called the 
Declaration of Right, the two Houses utter not a syllable of "a right to frame a 
government for themselves".  You will see that their whole care was to secure the 
religion, laws, and liberties that had been long possessed, and had been lately 
endangered.  "Taking into their most serious consideration the best means for making 
such an establishment, that their religion, laws, and liberties might not be in danger of 
being again subverted", they auspicate all their proceedings by stating as some of those 
best means, "in the first place" to do "as their ancestors in like cases have usually done 
for vindicating their ancient rights and liberties, to declare"— and then they pray the king 
and queen "that it may be declared and enacted that all and singular the rights and 
liberties asserted and declared are the true ancient and indubitable rights and liberties 
of the people of this kingdom". 
You will observe that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right it has been 
the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an entailed 
inheritance [a predetermiined order of succession of real property to heirs, such as 
Naboth’s vineyard, 1 Kings 21] derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted 
to our posterity — as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, 
without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right.  By this means 
our constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts.  We have an 
inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a House of Commons and a people 
inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties from a long line of ancestors. 
This policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection, or rather the 
happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it.  A 
spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views.  People 
will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors.  Besides, 
the people of England well know that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle 
of conservation and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a 
principle of improvement.  It leaves acquisition free, but it secures what it acquires.  
Whatever advantages are obtained by a state proceeding on these maxims are locked 
fast as in a sort of family settlement, grasped as in a kind of mortmain [unalienable 
holding of landed property] forever.  By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern 
of nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges in the 
same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives.  The 
institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of providence are handed down to 
us, and from us, in the same course and order.  Our political system is placed in a just 
correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world and with the mode of 
existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts, wherein, by the 
disposition of a stupendous wisdom, molding together the great mysterious 
incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old or middle-aged or 
young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied 
tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression.  Thus, by preserving the 
method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly 
new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete.  By adhering in this manner and 
on those principles to our forefathers, we are guided not by the superstition of 
antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic analogy.  In this choice of inheritance we 
have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood, binding up the 
constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental 
laws into the bosom of our family affections, keeping inseparable and cherishing with 
the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities our state, our hearths, 
our sepulchres, and our altars. 
Through the same plan of a conformity to nature in our artificial institutions, and 
by calling in the aid of her unerring and powerful instincts to fortify the fallible and feeble 
contrivances of our reason, we have derived several other, and those no small, benefits 
from considering our liberties in the light of an inheritance.  Always acting as if in the 
presence of canonized forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and 
excess, is tempered with an awful gravity.  This idea of a liberal descent inspires us 
with a sense of habitual native dignity which prevents that upstart insolence almost 
inevitably adhering to and disgracing those who are the first acquirers of any distinction.  
By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. 
It carries an imposing and majestic aspect.  It has a pedigree and illustrating 
ancestors.  It has its bearings and its ensigns armorial.  It has its gallery of portraits, its 
monumental inscriptions, its records, evidences, and titles.  We procure reverence to 
our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual 
men: on account of their age and on account of those from whom they are descended.  
All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a rational and 
manly freedom than the course that we have pursued, who have chosen our nature 
rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the great 
conservatories and magazines [armories] of our rights and privileges. 
. . . . 
It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France [Marie 
Antoinette], then the dauphiness, at Versailles; and surely never lighted on this orb, 
which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision.  I saw her just above the 
horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in –
glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendour, and joy.  Oh! what a revolution! 
and what an heart must I have, to contemplate without emotion that elevation and that 
fall!  Little did I dream when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusiastick, 
distant, respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote 
against disgrace concealed in that bosom; little did I dream that I should have lived to 
see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of 
honour, and of cavaliers.  I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their 
scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult.  But the age of 
chivalry is gone.  That of sophisters, oeconomists, and calculators, has succeeded; 
and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever.  Never, never more, shall we behold 
that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, 
that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an 
exalted freedom.  The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse 
of manly sentiment and heroic enterprize is gone!  It is gone, that sensibility of principle, 
that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it 
mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost 
half its evil, by losing all its grossness. 
 This mixed system of opinion and sentiment had its origin in the antient chivalry; 
and the principle, though varied in its appearance by the varying state of human affairs, 
subsisted and influenced through a long succession of generations, even to the time we 
live in.  If it should ever be totally extinguished, the loss I fear will be great.  It is this 
which has given its character to modern Europe.  It is this which has distinguished it 
under all its forms of government, and distinguished it to its advantage, from the states 
of Asia, and possibly from those states which flourished in the most brilliant periods of 
the antique world.  It was this, which, without confounding ranks, had produced a noble 
equality, and handed it down through all the gradations of social life.  It was this opinion 
which mitigated kings into companions, and raised private men to be fellows with kings.  
Without force, or opposition, it subdued the fierceness of pride and power; it obliged 
sovereigns to submit to the soft collar of social esteem, compelled stern authority to 
submit to elegance, and gave a domination vanquisher of laws, to be subdued by 
manners. 
 But now all is to be changed.  All the pleasing illusions, which made power 
gentle, and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, 
by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politicks the sentiments which beautify and 
soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and 
reason.  All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off.  All the super-added ideas, 
furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the 
understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, 
and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, 
absurd, and antiquated fashion. 
 On this scheme of things, a king is but a man, a queen is but a woman; a woman 
is but an animal, and an animal not of the highest order.  All homage paid to the sex in 
general as such, and without distinct views, is to be regarded as romance and folly.  
Regicide, and parricide, and sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition, corrupting 
jurisprudence by destroying its simplicity.  The murder of a king, or a queen, or a 
bishop, or a father, are only common homicide; and if the people are by any chance, or 
in any way gainers by it, a sort of homicide much the most pardonable, and into which 
we ought not to make too severe a scrutiny. 
 On the scheme of this barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts 
and muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid wisdom, as it is destitute of all 
taste and elegance, laws are to be supported only by their own terrors, and by the 
concern, which each individual may find in them, from his own private speculations, or 
can spare to them from his own private interest.  In the groves of their academy, at the 
end of every visto, you see nothing but the gallows.  Nothing is left which engages the 
affections on the part of the commonwealth.  On the principles of this mechanic 
philosophy [the Enlightenment idea that man is a machine, espoused by La Mettrie], 
our institutions can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in persons; so as to 
create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attachment.  But that sort of reason which 
banishes the affections is incapable of filling their place.  These public affections, 
combined with manners, are required sometimes as supplements, sometimes a 
correctives, always as aids to law.  The precept given by a wise man, as well as a great 
critic, for the construction of poems, is equally true as to states:--Non satis est pulchra 
esse poemata, dulcia sunto [“It is not enough for poems to be fine; they must charm” – 
Horace, De Arte Poetica].  There ought to be a system of manners in every nation, 
which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish.  To make us love our country, 
our country ought to be lovely. 
 But power, of some kind or other, will survive the shock in which manners and 
opinions perish; and it will find other and worse means for its support.  The usurpation 
which, in order to subvert ancient institutions, has destroyed ancient principles, will hold 
power by arts similar to those by which it has acquired it.  When the old feudal and 
chivalrous spirit of Fealty, which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and 
subjects from the precaution of tyranny, shall be extinct in the minds of men, plots and 
assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation, 
and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims, which form the political code of all power, 
not standing on its own honour, and the honour of those who are to obey it.  Kings will 
be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle. 
 When antient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly 
be estimated.  From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know 
distinctly to what port we steer.  Europe, undoubtedly, taken in a mass, was in a 
flourishing condition the day on which your revolution was completed.  How much of 
that prosperous state was owing to the spirit of our old manners and opinions is not 
easy to say; but as such causes cannot be indifferent in their operation, we must 
presume, that, on the whole, their operation was beneficial. 
 We are but too apt to consider things in the state in which we find them, without 
sufficiently adverting to the causes by which they have been produced, and possibly 
may be upheld.  Nothing is more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all 
the good things which are connected with manners, and with civilization, have, in this 
European world of ours, depended for ages upon two principles; and were indeed the 
result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion.  
The nobility and the clergy, the one by profession, the other by patronage, kept learning 
in existence, even in the midst of arms and confusions, and whilst governments were 
rather in their causes, than formed.  Learning paid back what it received to nobility and 
to priesthood; and paid it with usury, by enlarging their ideas, and by furnishing their 
minds.  Happy if they had all continued to know their indissoluble union, and their proper 
place!  Happy if learning, not debauched by ambition, had been satisfied to continue the 
instructor, and not aspired to be the master!  Along with its natural protectors and 
guardians, learning will be cast into the mire; and trodden down under the hoofs of a 
swinish multitude. 
 If, as I suspect, modern letters owe more than they are always willing to own to 
antient manners, so do other interests which we value full as much as they are worth.  
Even commerce, and trade, and manufacture, the gods of our oeconomical politicians, 
are themselves perhaps but creatures; are themselves but effects, which, as first 
causes, we choose to worship.  They certainly grew under the same shade in which 
learning flourished.  They too may decay with their natural protecting principles.  With 
you, for the present at least, they all threaten to disappear together.  Where trade and 
manufactures are wanting to a people, and the spirit of nobility and religion remains, 
sentiment supplies, and not always ill supplies, their place; but if commerce and the arts 
should be lost in an experiment to try how well a state may stand without these old 
fundamental principles, what sort of a thing must be a nation of gross, stupid, ferocious, 
and, at the same time, poor and sordid barbarians, destitute of religion, honour, or 
manly pride, possessing nothing at present, and hoping for nothing hereafter? . . . 
 [A few pages are devoted to the Rev. Dr. Richard Price, an English apologist for 
the French Revolution, and other such “loud and troublesome insects of the hour,” as 
well as to the allegations that were being made against Louis XVI, the king of France]. 
 . . . If the king and queen of France, and their children, were to fall into our hands 
by chance of war, in the most acrimonious of all hostilities (I deprecate such an event, I 
deprecate such hostility) they would be treated with another sort of triumphal entry into 
London.  We formerly have had a king of France in that situation; you have read how he 
was treated by the victor in the field; and in what manner he was afterwards received in 
England.  Four hundred years have gone over us; but I believe we are not materially 
changed since that period.  Thanks to our sullen resistance to innovation, thanks to the 
cold sluggishness of our national character, we still bear the stamp of our forefathers.  
We have not (as I conceive) lost the generosity and dignity of thinking of the fourteenth 
century; nor as yet have we subtilized ourselves into savages.  We are not the converts 
of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress 
amongst us.  Atheists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers [probably a 
dig at Rousseau, as a reading of Rousseau’s chapter on “The Legislator” would 
suggest].  We know that we have made no discoveries; and we think that no discoveries 
are to be made, in morality; nor many in the great principles of government, nor in the 
ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, altogether as well as 
they will be after the grave has heaped its mould upon our presumption, and the silent 
tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity.  In England we have not yet been 
completely disemboweled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and we cherish 
and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active 
monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals.  We have not 
been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, 
with chaff and rags, and paltry, blurred shreds of paper about the rights of man.   We 
preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry 
and infidelity.  We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms.  We fear 
God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to 
magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility.   Why?  Because 
when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected; because 
all other feelings are false and spurious, and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our 
primary morals, to render us unfit for rational liberty; and by teaching us a servile, 
licentious, and abandoned insolence, to be our low sport for a few holidays, to make us 
perfectly fit for, and justly deserving of slavery, through the whole course of our lives. 
 You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we 
are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old 
prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to 
ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have 
lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them.  We are 
afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because 
we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better 
to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages.  Many of our 
men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to 
discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them.  If they find what they seek, and they 
seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, 
than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and leave nothing but the naked reason; 
because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an 
affection which will give it permanence.  Prejudice is of ready application in an 
emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, 
and does not leave a man hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled, and 
unresolved.  Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his habit; and not a series of 
disconnected acts.  Through just prejudice, his duty becomes part of his nature. 
 Your literary men, and your politicians, and so do the whole clan of the 
enlightened among us, essentially differ in these points.  They have no respect for the 
wisdom of others; but they pay it off by a very full measure of confidence in their own.  
With them it is a sufficient motive to destroy an old scheme of things, because it is an 
old one.  As to the new, they are in no sort of fear with regard to the duration of a 
building run up in haste; because duration is no object to those who think little or 
nothing has been done before their time, and who place all their hopes in discovery.  
They conceive, very systematically, that all things which give perpetuity are 
mischievous, and therefore they are at inexpiable war with all establishments [cf. Roger 
Scruton’s “culture of repudiation”].  They think that government may vary like modes of 
dress, and with a little ill effect.  That there needs no principle of attachment, except a 
sense of present conveniency, to any constitution of the state.  They always speak as if 
they were of opinion that there is a singular species of compact between them and their 
magistrates, but which has nothing reciprocal in it, but that the majority of the people 
has a right to dissolve it without any reason, but its will. Their attachment to their 
country itself, is only so far as it agrees with some of their fleeting projects; it begins and 
ends with that scheme of polity which falls in with their momentary opinion. . . . 
 We know, and what is better we feel inwardly, that religion is the basis of civil 
society, and the source of all good and of all comfort.  In England we are so convinced 
of this, that there is no rust of superstition, with which the accumulated absurdity of the 
human mind might have crusted it over in the course of ages, that ninety-nine in a 
hundred of the people of England would not prefer to impiety.  We shall never be such 
fools as to call in an enemy to the substance of any system to remove its corruptions, to 
supply its defects, or to perfect its construction.  If our religious tenets should ever want 
a further elucidation, we shall not call on atheists to explain them.  We shall not light up 
our temple from that unhallowed fire.  It will be illuminated with other lights.  It will be 
perfumed with other incense, than the infectious stuff which is imported by the 
smugglers of adulterated metaphysics.  If our ecclesiastical establishment should want 
a revision, it is not avarice or rapacity, public or private, that we shall employ for the 
audit, or receipt, or application of its consecrated revenue. – Violently condemning 
neither the Greek nor the Armenian, nor, since heats are subsided, the Roman system 
of religion, we prefer the Protestant; not because we think it has less of the Christian 
religion in it, but because, in our judgment, it has more.  We are protestants, not from 
indifference but from zeal. 
 We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious 
animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot 
prevail long.  But if, in the moment of riot, and in a drunken delirium from the hot spirit 
drawn out of the alembick of hell, which in France is now so furiously boiling, we should 
uncover our nakedness by throwing off that Christian religion which has hitherto been 
our boast and comfort, and one great source of civilization amongst us, and among 
many other nations, we are apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not 
endure a void) that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition, might take 
place of it. 
 For that reason, before we take from our establishment the natural human means 
of estimation, and give it up to contempt, as you have done, and in doing it have 
incurred the penalties you well deserve to suffer, we desire that some other may be 
presented to us in the place of it.  We shall then form our judgment.  On these ideas, 
instead of quarrelling with establishments, as some do who have made a philosophy 
and a religion of their hostility to such institutions, we cleave closely to them.  We are 
resolved to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established 
aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no 
greater.  I shall show you presently how much of each of these we possess. 
It has been the misfortune (not, as these gentlemen think it, the glory) of this age 
that everything is to be discussed as if the constitution of our country were to be always 
a subject rather of altercation than enjoyment.  For this reason, as well as for the 
satisfaction of those among you (if any such you have among you) who may wish to 
profit of examples, I venture to trouble you with a few thoughts upon each of these 
establishments.  I do not think they were unwise in ancient Rome who, when they 
wished to new-model their laws, set commissioners to examine the best constituted 
republics within their reach. 
 First, I beg leave to speak of our church establishment, which is the first of our 
prejudices, not a prejudice destitute of reason, but involving in it profound and extensive 
wisdom.  I speak of it first.  It is first and last and midst in our minds.  For, taking ground 
on that religious system of which we are now in possession, we continue to act on the 
early received and uniformly continued sense of mankind.  That sense not only, like a 
wise architect, hath built up the august fabric of states, but, like a provident proprietor, to 
preserve the structure from profanation and ruin, as a sacred temple purged from all the 
impurities of fraud and violence and injustice and tyranny, hath solemnly and forever 
consecrated the commonwealth and all that officiate in it.  This consecration is made 
that all who administer the government of men, in which they stand in the person of God 
himself, should have high and worthy notions of their function and destination, that their 
hope should be full of immortality, that they should not look to the paltry pelf of the 
moment nor to the temporary and transient praise of the vulgar, but to a solid, 
permanent existence in the permanent part of their nature, and to a permanent fame 
and glory in the example they leave as a rich inheritance to the world. 
Such sublime principles ought to be infused into persons of exalted situations, 
and religious establishments provided that may continually revive and enforce them.  
Every sort of moral, every sort of civil, every sort of politic institution, aiding the rational 
and natural ties that connect the human understanding and affections to the divine, are 
not more than necessary in order to build up that wonderful structure Man, whose 
prerogative it is to be in a great degree a creature of his own making, and who, when 
made as he ought to be made, is destined to hold no trivial place in the creation.  But 
whenever man is put over men, as the better nature ought ever to preside, in that case 
more particularly, he should as nearly as possible be approximated to his perfection. 
 The consecration of the state by a state religious establishment is necessary, also, to 
operate with a wholesome awe upon free citizens, because, in order to secure their 
freedom, they must enjoy some determinate portion of power.  To them, therefore, a 
religion connected with the state, and with their duty toward it, becomes even more 
necessary than in such societies where the people, by the terms of their subjection, are 
confined to private sentiments and the management of their own family concerns.  All 
persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed 
with an idea that they act in trust, and that they are to account for their conduct in that 
trust to the one great Master, Author, and Founder of society. 
This principle ought even to be more strongly impressed upon the minds of those 
who compose the collective sovereignty than upon those of single princes.  Without 
instruments, these princes can do nothing.  Whoever uses instruments, in finding helps, 
finds also impediments.  Their power is, therefore, by no means complete, nor are they 
safe in extreme abuse.  Such persons, however elevated by flattery, arrogance, and 
self-opinion, must be sensible that, whether covered or not by positive law, in some way 
or other they are accountable even here for the abuse of their trust.  If they are not cut 
off by a rebellion of their people, they may be strangled by the very janissaries kept for 
their security against all other rebellion.  Thus we have seen the king of France sold by 
his soldiers for an increase of pay.  But where popular authority is absolute and 
unrestrained, the people have an infinitely greater, because a far better founded, 
confidence in their own power.  They are themselves, in a great measure, their own 
instruments.  They are nearer to their objects.  Besides, they are less under 
responsibility to one of the greatest controlling powers on the earth, the sense of fame 
and estimation.  The share of infamy that is likely to fall to the lot of each individual in 
public acts is small indeed, the operation of opinion being in the inverse ratio to the 
number of those who abuse power.  Their own approbation of their own acts has to 
them the appearance of a public judgment in their favor.  A perfect democracy is, 
therefore, the most shameless thing in the world.  As it is the most shameless, it is also 
the most fearless.  No man apprehends in his person that he can be made subject to 
punishment.  Certainly the people at large never ought, for as all punishments are for 
example toward the conservation of the people at large, the people at large can never 
become the subject of punishment by any human hand.   It is therefore of infinite 
importance that they should not be suffered to imagine that their will, any more than that 
of kings, is the standard of right and wrong.  They ought to be persuaded that they are 
full as little entitled, and far less qualified with safety to themselves, to use any arbitrary 
power whatsoever; that therefore they are not, under a false show of liberty, but in truth 
to exercise an unnatural, inverted domination, tyrannically to exact from those who 
officiate in the state not an entire devotion to their interest, which is their right, but an 
abject submission to their occasional will, extinguishing thereby in all those who 
serve them all moral principle, all sense of dignity, all use of judgment, and all 
consistency of character; whilst by the very same process they give themselves up a 
proper, a suitable, but a most contemptible prey to the servile ambition of popular 
sycophants or courtly flatterers. 
When the people have emptied themselves of all the lust of selfish will, which 
without religion it is utterly impossible they ever should, when they are conscious that 
they exercise, and exercise perhaps in a higher link of the order of delegation, the 
power, which to be legitimate must be according to that eternal, immutable law in which 
will and reason are the same, they will be more careful how they place power in base 
and incapable hands. In their nomination to office, they will not appoint to the exercise 
of authority as to a pitiful job, but as to a holy function, not according to their sordid, 
selfish interest, nor to their wanton caprice, nor to their arbitrary will, but they will confer 
that power (which any man may well tremble to give or to receive) on those only in 
whom they may discern that predominant proportion of active virtue and wisdom, taken 
together and fitted to the charge, such as in the great and inevitable mixed mass of 
human imperfections and infirmities is to be found. 
When they are habitually convinced that no evil can be acceptable, either in the 
act or the permission, to him whose essence is good, they will be better able to extirpate 
out of the minds of all magistrates, civil, ecclesiastical, or military, anything that bears 
the least resemblance to a proud and lawless domination. 
But one of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and 
the laws are consecrated is, lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, 
unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors or of what is due to their 
posterity, should act as if they were the entire masters, that they should not think it 
among their rights to cut off the entail or commit waste on the inheritance by destroying 
at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society, hazarding to leave to those 
who come after them a ruin instead of an habitation [i.e., a “tumble-down house”] — 
and teaching these successors as little to respect their contrivances as they had 
themselves respected the institutions of their forefathers. By this unprincipled facility of 
changing the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are floating 
fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be 
broken.  No one generation could link with the other.  Men would become little better 
than the flies of a summer. 
And first of all, the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, 
which with all its defects, redundancies, and errors is the collected reason of ages, 
combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns, as 
a heap of old exploded errors, would be no longer studied.  Personal self-sufficiency 
and arrogance (the certain attendants upon all those who have never experienced a 
wisdom greater than their own) would usurp the tribunal.  Of course, no certain laws, 
establishing invariable grounds of hope and fear, would keep the actions of men in a 
certain course or direct them to a certain end.  Nothing stable in the modes of holding 
property or exercising function could form a solid ground on which any parent could 
speculate in the education of his offspring or in a choice for their future establishment in 
the world.  No principles would be early worked into the habits.  As soon as the most 
able instructor had completed his laborious course of institution, instead of sending forth 
his pupil, accomplished in a virtuous discipline, fitted to procure him attention and 
respect in his place in society, he would find everything altered, and that he had turned 
out a poor creature to the contempt and derision of the world, ignorant of the true 
grounds of estimation.  Who would insure a tender and delicate sense of honor to beat 
almost with the first pulses of the heart when no man could know what would be the test 
of honor in a nation continually varying the standard of its coin?  No part of life would 
retain its acquisitions.  Barbarism with regard to science and literature, unskilfulness 
with regard to arts and manufactures, would infallibly succeed to the want of a steady 
education and settled principle; and thus the commonwealth itself would, in a few 
generations, crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality, 
and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven. 
To avoid, therefore, the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times 
worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we have consecrated the 
state, that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions but with due 
caution; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion, that 
he should approach to the faults of the state as to the wounds of a father, with pious 
awe and trembling solicitude.  By this wise prejudice we are taught to look with horror 
on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent to 
pieces, and put him in the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, 
and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their 
father’s life. 
 Society is indeed a contract.  Subordinate contracts for objects of mere 
occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure – but the state ought not be 
considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and 
coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up by the fancy 
of the parties.  It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership 
in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable 
nature.  It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every 
virtue, and in all perfection.  As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in 
many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but 
between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.  Each 
contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal 
society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible 
world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all 
physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place [the Great Chain of Being].  
This law is not subject to the will of those, who by an obligation of those above them, 
and infinitely superior, are bound to submit to that law.  The universal corporations of 
that universal kingdom are not morally at liberty at their pleasure, and on their 
speculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder the 
bands of their subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an unsocial, uncivil, 
unconnected chaos of elementary principles.  It is the first and supreme necessity only, 
a necessity that is not chosen but chooses, a necessity paramount to deliberation, that 
admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can justify a resort to 
anarchy.  This necessity is no exception to the rule; because this necessity itself is a 
part too of that moral and physical disposition of things to which man must be obedient 
by consent or force; but if that which is only submission to necessity should be made 
the object of choice, the law is broken, nature is disobeyed, and the rebellious are 
outlawed, cast forth, and exiled, from this world of reason, and order, and peace, and 
virtue, and fruitful penitence, into the antagonist world of madness, discord, riot, 
confusion, and unavailing sorrow.  [cf. Matthew 13: 41-42].    
 
Burke Study Questions 
 
1. Burke begins by noting that the benefits of various ideas about liberty and natural rights depend 
on circumstances; they are not inherently good or bad.  He then shows how the English 
Constitution is an inheritance that has been built and modified over generations.  What is the 
source of English rights and liberties?  What kind of guarantees protect them? 
  
2. Burke’s contrast between the age of chivalry and that of “sophisters, economists, and  
 calculators” is reminiscent of the contrast between realism and nominalism in the medieval 
  debate.  What does Burke mean by the “unbought grace of life?”  How does he depict the age 
 of chivalry [see chapter 4 on courtesy] and the character it gave to modern Europe?  Does his 
 “sentimental” description of “the wardrobe of a moral imagination” strengthen or weaken his 
  case?  [See the concluding paragraph].  How “realistic” is his analysis of the slippery slope of 
  moral relativism? 
 
3. What does he mean by saying that “on the principles of this mechanick philosophy, our  
 institutions can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in persons”?   Thought  
question: What are some of the ways in which “publick affections” are created and sustained?  
Burke’s “system of manners” would include styles of public architecture [cf. chapter 8]: “To make 
us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.” 
 
4. What does Burke suggest when he remarks that “power . . . will survive the shock in which 
manner and opinions perish”?  Does he mean potestas or potentia?  What may be expected 
when fealty [personal loyalty to one’s liege lord] yields to the expediency of “policy”?   The last 
sentence of this paragraph encapsulates the lessons of chapter 5 in the Minogue book. 
 
5. Identify the two spirits that produced European civilization (the natural protectors of learning). 
 How were they once given institutional form and kept alive?  Scholarship [learning] paid back the 
  nobility and priesthood with interest [e.g., in the development of modern science and the arts].   
 But what does Burke mean by suggesting that learning “aspired to be the master”?  [It should be 
  noted that Mary Shelley wrote Frankenstein only a generation later].   
 
6. What does modern life generally, and not just “modern letters,” owe to “antient manners”?  
Idolatry appears to be an important theme of Burke’s Reflections.  In fact, in this paragraph – “the 
gods of our oeconomical politicians” – Burke makes an allusion to Rom. 1:25:” “Who changed the 
truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is 
blessed forever. Amen.”  William James saw “tender-mindedness” as a kind of idolatry.  But it 
appears that Edmund Burke says the same thing of such “tough-mindedness.”  Who is right?  Or, 
could it be that both are right? 
 
7. In the section that follows, how does Burke illustrate what he means by “the spirit of a gentleman” 
  and “the spirit of religion?”  As to the first, he recounts the treatment of the French king (probably 
  John II, who was captured by the Black Prince in 1356 and lived out his days in luxurious 
  captivity).  Burke’s disregard for the French philosophes is evident.  How does he contrast the 
  English with the French character?  How does he regard religion?  [Establishments of religion 
  began with Lutheran Sweden in the 1520s and Anglican Britain in the 1530s as a step in the 
  direction of the secularization of the national state]. 
 
8. Who are the life-renters he wishes to prevent from being able to dissipate this inheritance and 
destroy the fabric of society?  [He describes them as “insects of the hour” and “the flies of a 
summer”].  How does barbarism arise? 
 
9. Rhetorically, Burke uses considerable irony, particular when he discusses how English gentlemen 
would treat the king and queen of France if they had been captured.  He also mocks the limits of 
“private reason” and the anti-religious character of the Enlightenment and the Revolution.   What 
sort of “social contract” does Burke exalt?  A selection from Rousseau’s Social Contract follows 
the notes for chapter 10.  
 
A very moving illustration of the moral imagination at work during the French Revolution is recounted in 
an Appendix to Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s Leftism.  It is entitled “The Tragic Life of Charles-Armand 
Tuffin, Marquis de la Rouërie.”  Tuffin is also a forgotten hero of the American War for Independence.  
Elsewhere in the book, the author is detailed and unsparing in his depiction of the monstrous depravities 
inflicted by mobs and tyrants on their victims, such as the hundreds of members of the Swiss Guard who 
protected the royal family but who were ordered by Louis XVI to surrender to the mob.  If only the king 
had read Burke first, he might not have appeased the mob and thus spared both his protectors and his 
country. 
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